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Landau: A Judge's Perspective on the Use and Misuse of History in State C

A JUDGE'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE USE AND
MISUSE OF HISTORY IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Honorable Jack L. Landau*
Readers should be very attentive to, and critical of, historians,
and they, in turn, should be constantly on their guard.'
As the state constitutional revolution marches forward into a fourth
decade, state judges are beginning to exhibit concern not just for whether
to give their state constitutions independent significance but also how to
do so. In the process, more and more state courts are turning to history
to support their decisions as to the meaning of their constitutions.
Most often, history is invoked in the service of ascertaining the
"intentions" of the "framers" of the state constitutions. The objective is
obvious. State constitutional interpretation must not reflect merely the
personal predilections of those who do the interpreting. Instead,
constitutional interpretation should be the product of considerations
external to the judges involved. History in general, and a jurisprudence
of original intent in particular, the theory goes, provides just such a set of
external considerations. Resort to history, in other words, provides
legitimacy to state constitutional interpretation. As the Supreme Court
of Connecticut explained, with some flourish:
This court has never viewed constitutional language
as newly descended from the firmament like fresh fallen
snow upon which jurists may trace out their individual
notions of public policy uninhibited by the history
which attended the adoption of the particular
phraseology at issue and the intentions of its authors.
The faith which democratic societies repose in the
written document as a shield against the arbitrary
exercise of governmental power would be illusory if
those vested with the responsibility for construing and

Judge, Oregon Court of Appeals; Adjunct Professor of Law, Willamette University
College of Law. Thanks to Robert Atkinson, Diane Bridge, Robert Bulkley, Walt Edmonds,
Keith Garza, Jonathan Hoffman, Matt Malmsheimer, David Schuman, and Pamela Wood
for reviewing drafts of this essay.
1
POLYBIUS, HISTORY, book XIV.
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applying disputed provisions were free to stray from the
2
purposes of the originators.
The problem is that we state court judges tend to make something of
a mess of history in the process. In the name of identifying the intentions
of the framers of our state constitutions, we employ research and
reasoning that would make practicing historians blush.
Now, I wish to be clear: I am an intermediate appellate court judge,
not a professional historian. But my job entails working with American
legal history on a fairly frequent basis. And, in the course of that work
over the past decade, I have encountered what seem to me practices that
are hard to square with basic, uncontroversial principles of responsible
historical analysis. One does not have to be a professional historian to
understand that there are limits to what reasonably can be asserted as
history. My objective in this essay is to address some of the problems
that I have observed when judges resort to history.
Among the problems that I address are the practice of resorting to
history to answer nonhistorical questions, the problem of determining
the appropriate levels of generality at which to describe history, the
problem of selective use of source materials, the problem of drawing
conclusions from silence in the historical record, the problem of
employing fictions to fill in gaps in the historical record, and the failure
to recognize the inherent uncertainties involved in describing history. I
attempt to pepper the essay with examples from cases in which courts
have resorted to history to justify their interpretations of state
constitutions. I hope I may be forgiven for reporting a disproportionate
number of examples from my own state. I do so not because its judges
are especially insensitive to the perils of resorting to history but because
Oregon's is the case law with which I am most familiar.
In the end, I suggest that whatever else may be said of a
jurisprudence of original intent, it must be recognized that resorting to
history unavoidably involves a number of value judgments that cannot
be resolved by reference to history itself. Moreover, resorting to history
without great care can lead to historical absurdities that, as the saying
goes, only lawyers would believe. Failure to recognize candidly the
judgments involved and failure to pay attention to details leads to

2

Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 469 A.2d 1201, 1208 (Conn. 1984).
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erroneous history, justifiable criticism, and the undermining of the very
legitimacy that resorting to history is supposed to advance.
I.

HISTORY, THE SQUARE PEG, AND THE ROUND HOLE

The first-and perhaps foremost- problem concerning the judicial
use of history is the very idea that history, by itself, can establish the
meaning of a constitutional provision. State courts commonly describe
constitutional interpretation in terms of merely identifying what the
3
framers of a disputed provision intended it to mean.
The Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Lakin v. Senco Products,
Inc.,4 illustrates the practice. In that case, the court addressed the
question whether a limitation on noneconomic damages awarded on a
negligence claim violated the Oregon Constitution's guarantee that the
right of a jury trial shall remain "inviolate." 5 The court turned to the
history of the Oregon Constitution and the intentions of its framers in
1857 to arrive at the conclusion that those framers would have
understood that a cap on noneconomic damages would abrogate the
constitutional guarantee:
[W]e conclude that the framers of the Oregon
Constitution clearly understood the meaning of the right
to jury trial in a civil case and that they intended that
that right would remain "inviolate," i.e., secure against
violation or impairment, in the new State of Oregon. It
follows, therefore, that whatever the right to "Trial by Jury"
6
meant in 1857, it means precisely the same thing today.
Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that, having determined
what the framers intended, it "therefore" also had determined what the
constitution means.

A word about my use of the word "framers": Courts tend to use the term loosely to
refer to those who drafted a constitution or the people who ratified it or both. I use the
term in the same loose fashion. There actually is an interesting question whether the
intentions of those who drafted constitutions should matter. See, e.g., Monaghan v. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 315 P.2d 797, 801 (1957) ("The constitution derives its force and effect from the
people who ratified it and not from the proceedings of the convention where it was framed
..... "); see also infra note 137.
4
987 P.2d 463 (1999).
5
OR. CONST. art. I, § 17.
6
Lakin, 987 P.2d at 469-70 (emphasis added).
3
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The Wyoming Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in State v.
Campbell County School District,7 in which it invoked the words of Robert
H. Bork in defense of what it termed its belief in a "historically rooted"
constitution: "Lawyers and judges should seek in the Constitution what
they seek in other legal texts: the original meaning of the words ....
[AIl that counts is how the words used in the Constitution would have
been used at the time." s
It is in fact, fairly routine for courts to describe the interpretation of
state constitutions as an essentially archeological exercise of exhuming
The Iowa Supreme Court, for example,
the framers' intentions.
explained that in determining the "actual meaning" of its constitution,
"[o]ur polestar in this analysis is the intent of the framers." 9 The South
Dakota Supreme Court, likewise, stated that "the object of construing a
constitution is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it."10 The Supreme Court of Indiana
similarly has concluded that "the intent of the framers of the
Constitution is paramount in determining the meaning of a
[constitutional] provision.""
The difficulty, as a number of scholars have pointed out, is that those
are two entirely different questions. 12 The first question-what did the

32 P.3d 325 (Wyo. 2001).
Id. at 336 (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144-45 (1990)).
9
State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Iowa 2003).
10 In re Janklow, 589 N.W.2d 624, 626 (S.D. 1999).
11 City Chapel Evangelical Free, Inc. v. City of South Bend ex rel. Dep't of
Redevelopment, 744 N.E.2d 443,447 (Ind.2001). The court added:
In order to give life to their intended meaning, we examine the
language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its
drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our constitution,
and case law interpreting the specific provisions. In construing the
constitution, we look to the history of the times, and examine the state
of things existing when the constitution or any part thereof was
framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and the
remedy. The language of each provision of the Constitution must be
treated with particular deference, as though every word had been
hammered into place.
Id. (quoting McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 986 (Ind.2000)).
12
H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists,73 VA. L. REV. 659, 662 (1987) ("[H]istory has
nothing to say to the listener who replies, after hearing the originalist's evidence, 'So
what?"').
The literature on whether the framers' intentions are determinative of
constitutional meaning is extensive and controversial. For an introduction to the debate,
7
8
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framers intend? - certainly is one of history. The second question,
however-what does the constitution mean?-is different. It concerns
the legal significance of the historical fact of what the framers intended.
It is by no means obvious that, because we may know what the framers
intended a particular constitutional provision to mean, that also defines
the extent of its legal significance. Certainly that conclusion does not
necessarily follow as a matter of history.
Recall that the usual justifications for a jurisprudence of original
intent are not historical, but philosophical. For example, former United
States Attorney General Edwin Meese III, who devoted so much energy
during the 1980s to justifying a jurisprudence of original intent with
respect to the Federal Constitution, explained that:
[t]he Constitution is the fundamental will of the people;
that is the reason the Constitution is the fundamental
law. To allow the courts to govern simply by what it
[sic] views at the time to be fair and decent, is a scheme
of government no longer popular; the idea of democracy
13
has suffered.
The argument is one of political theory, not history. Bork, another
frequent defender of originalism, similarly has argued that:
[i]f the [United States] Constitution is law, then
presumably its meaning, like that of all other law, is the
meaning the lawmakers were understood to have
intended. If the Constitution is law, then presumably,
like all other law, the meaning the lawmakers intended
is as binding upon judges as it is upon legislatures and
There is no other sense in which the
executives.
Constitution can be what article VI proclaims it to be:
14
"Law."
Said another way, the thesis is that the framers' intentions are
controlling because of the nature of the document that they framed, that

see generally Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guidefor the Perplexed,49 OHIlO ST.
L.J. 1085 (1989).
13 Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution,27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455,465 (1986).
14 BORK, supra note 8, at 145.
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It is thus, an argument of law or political theory, but not

That is not to say that arguments about constitutional meaning
cannot be cast in historical terms. It certainly can be argued that the
framers' intentions should determine constitutional meaning because, as
a matter of history, that is what they intended. There are, however, at
least two problems with the argument. First, it is circular. To resort to
history to ascertain whether the framers intended their intentions to
matter assumes the very question at issue, namely, that we should resort
to history to justify the reference to framers' intentions in first place. In
other words, unless it is assumed that the framers' intentions matter,
15
then it is of no consequence that that is what they intended.
Second, assuming that it is appropriate to determine whether the
framers of a constitution intended their intentions to matter, the answer
to the question-as a matter of history-is in doubt, certainly with
respect to constitutions adopted before the Civil War. It is hotly debated
whether the framers of the United States Constitution, for example,
shared the view that their intentions should control future
determinations as to the meaning of that document. 16 Scholars such as
H. Jefferson Powell17 and Hans Baade' 8 have suggested that the idea that
the framers of the Federal Constitution intended their intentions to count
is probably inconsistent with contemporaneous understandings as to
proper interpretation of legal instruments. On the other hand, Raoul
Berger - among others-has argued rather vociferously that early
references to "original intent" in various documents of the founding era
suggest the contrary, although he never quite addresses Powell's and

See generally Russel M. Nigro, The Importance of Interpretive Theory in State Constitutional
Law, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 905, 909 (2000) ("The argument that the drafters' wishes must be
followed because they wished it so is viciously circular."); Powell, supra note 12, at 662
("The argument that the founders' wishes must be followed because they wished it so is
viciously circular, as well as arguably based on a historical error.").
16
See generally Farber, supra note 12.
17
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
15

(1985).
18
Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in HistoricalPerspective: Some CriticalGlosses, 69 TEX.
L. REV. 1001 (1991).
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Baade's point that it is necessary to go further and determine what the
framers would have understood those references to mean.19
I do not mean to suggest that a jurisprudence of original intent is
untenable. That is a matter for another essay. I do suggest that, having
determined what the framers intended a provision to mean, it does not
necessarily follow that a court also has determined what the provision
means. At the least, some explanation is required to justify resort to
history to answer what is arguably a non-historical question. The simple
declaration that what a constitutional provision meant in the nineteenth
century it must also mean today is misleading.
II.

HISTORY AND THE PROBLEM OF GENERALIZATION

A second problem with resorting to history to establish
constitutional meaning is a close cousin of the first. It arises when courts
are forced to apply constitutional provisions to questions and
circumstances beyond the fair contemplation of those who framed them.
Particularly in states whose constitutions date back to the eighteenth or
nineteenth century, it is common for courts to face constitutional
challenges involving circumstances that simply were unimagined at the
Did the framers of a
time their constitutions were adopted.
constitutional right to bear arms intend that citizens of a state have a
right to possess AK-47 assault rifles? Did they understand that trials
televised from prisons satisfy a constitutional right to a "public" trial?
Did they intend that there be an "automobile" exception to the
constitutional presumption that warrants are required for searches?
History cannot answer those specific questions. Or, perhaps more
precisely, the answer that history will provide in each instance is that the
framers simply did not think of the matter. In the face of that fact,
however, courts commonly do not abandon the search for an answer in
history. They simply rephrase the question in a more generalized way.
The Vermont Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. State20 nicely
illustrates the practice. The issue in that case was whether a state law
making homosexual couples ineligible for a marriage license violated the

Raoul Berger, The Founders' Views- According to Jefferson Powell, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1033
(1989); Raoul Berger, "OriginalIntention" in HistoricalPerspective,54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296
(1986).
20
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
19
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state's "Common Benefits Clause."21 In determining that the exclusion
of same-sex couples from the benefits incident to marriage indeed
violated the state constitution, the court resorted to a historical analysis
of the clause. Now, considering that the Vermont Constitution has
undergone little revision in the last 200 years, it might seem odd to look
to history to support a conclusion that discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is unconstitutional. After all, the State of Vermont,
like so many other states in the colonial and revolutionary eras, thought
nothing of criminalizing homosexual conduct. 22
The Vermont Supreme Court, however, did not look back on its
constitutional history with so sharp a focus. Instead, it said that its duty
"is to discover ... the core value that gave life" to the disputed
constitutional provision:
Out of the shifting and complicated kaleidoscope of
events, social forces, and ideas that culminated in the
Vermont Constitution of 1777, our task is to distill the
The
essence, the motivating ideal of the framers.
challenge is to remain faithful to that historical ideal,
while addressing contemporary issues that the framers
undoubtedly could never have imagined. 23
Having stated the focus of its inquiry so broadly, the court had no
difficulty identifying in the state's history support for the conclusion that
the "core value" of the Common Benefits Clause was a "principle of
inclusion" that, in the absence of persuasive government justification,
24
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
There are at least two significant difficulties with using history in
this fashion. First, it employs an assumption that such "core values"
even exist and can be identified. Such an assumption reflects what

Chapter I, article 7, of the Vermont Constitution provides "[t]hat government is, or
ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people,
nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single
person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that community." Id.
22 Acts and Laws of the State of Vermont (1779).
23 Baker, 744 A.2d at 874.
24 Interestingly, one of the state's arguments was that the long history of official
intolerance of homosexuality could not be squared with the court's reading of the Common
Benefits Clause. The court's reply was that, among other things, "'equal protection of the
laws cannot be limited by eighteenth-century standards."' Id. at 885 (quoting Brigham v.
State, 692 A.2d 384, 396 (Vt. 1997)).
21
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historian David Hackett Fischer in his classic text, Historian's Fallacies:
Toward a Logic of Historical Thought,25 calls the "fallacy of essences."
Fischer explains that there simply is no such thing as historical essences:
The fallacy of essences is tempting to historians, because
many of them begin with an article of faith (which I
happen to share) that history happened in the way that
it happened and not in any other way. But it does not
follow from this premise that there is one "essential"
inner reality, which can be hunted and found. There are
many factual patterns-an infinite number of themwhich can be superimposed upon past events. A
historian's task is to find patterns which are more
relevant to his problems, and more accurate and more
comprehensive than others, but he cannot hope to find
that "essential" pattern, any more than he can hope to
know all of history, and to know it objectively. 26
Essences, in other words, are inventions of the historian, explanatory
constructs that are superimposed on past events. The trick is that there
always are multiple explanatory patterns that may be imposed on the
same past events, all of which fully account for the known facts. Which
one is the correct one? It is really a meaningless question. None of them
are "correct" in the sense that one accurately describes what actually
"happened." And all of them are "correct" in the sense that they all are
consistent with known past events.
That leads to the second problem, which is determining the proper
level of generalization or abstraction at which to describe the core value
or essence that the history supposedly reflects. The same historical
events will give rise to any number of defensible generalizations. Yetand this is the devilishly unavoidable fact-history itself will provide no
basis for deciding what is the "correct" level of generalization.
Judges and scholars are not unaware of this problem. But their
response commonly is merely to declare that the solution lies in "fairly"
selecting the level of generality to comport with the history and text of
the constitutional provision at issue. Bork, for example, has argued that
"[o]riginal understanding avoids the problem of the level of generality

25

DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES:

THOUGHT 70 (1970).
26

Id.
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...by finding the level of generality that interpretation of the words,
structure, and history of the Constitution fairly supports." 27 Keith
Whittington, one of originalism's most careful and thoughtful defenders,
contends in response to the generalization objection that "the search for
intention must be guided by the historical evidence itself." 28 Such
suggestions, however, are less solutions than restatements of the
problem. What is the level of generality that the constitutional text and
history "fairly" supports? As often as not, there will be more than one,
and neither text nor history will determine the better.
Consider, for example, a case from my own court, Oregon State
Shooting Ass'n v. Multnomah County.29 In that case, the Oregon Court of
Appeals addressed the question whether the provision of the Oregon
Constitution that guarantees a "right to bear arms in defence [sic] of
themselves, and of the State" applied to the possession of assault rifles.
A majority of the court, sitting en banc, concluded that it did not. The
majority - including me, candor impels me to note - struggled to explain
what a weapon "of the sort" known in the mid-nineteenth century might
include. The majority acknowledged that there existed at the time a
repeating rifle known as "the Volcanic," some of which may have made
their way to the Oregon Territory before 1857. Yet, the majority
ultimately concluded that such a weapon is qualitatively "different"
30
from the sort of semi-automatic assault weapons that were at issue.
The dissent, on the other hand, thought that the existence of repeating
rifles such as the Volcanic was dispositive. They are repeating rifles; so
are Beretta AR-70s. Hence, the latter are the same "sort" of weapons that
the framers of the Oregon Constitution intended all citizens would have
31
the right to possess.
Note that there was little disagreement as to the historical record.
The principal disagreement was determining the level of generality with
which to describe it. If the framers thought that citizens should have the
right to possess a Volcanic rifle, what is the appropriate "core value" that
BORK, supra note 8, at 150; see also Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular
Conceptions of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 679 (1991) ("[A] judge should
try not to articulate the most general aspect of the original understanding of a
constitutional provision at a level of generality any broader than the relevant materials ...
warrant.").
28 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
TEXTUAL MEANING,
27

ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 187 (1999).
29

30
31

858 P.2d 1315 (Or. App. 1993).
Id. at 1318-20.
Id. at 1325 (Edmonds, J.,
dissenting).
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may be gleaned from that historical fact? Is it that Oregonians have the
right to possess any weapon of personal defense? Any weapon of
personal defense that fires a bullet? Any weapon of personal defense
that is capable of manual, but not automatic, repetitive firing? There are
any number of ways to abstract from the historical fact of the existence of
a Volcanic rifle a defensible "core value" for the purposes of
constitutional interpretation. And history itself lends nothing in the way
of assistance in determining which is the correct one.
The problem of generalization is unavoidable. It arises every time a
judge or lawyer attempts to divine the significance of a line of
precedent. 32 Part of every first-year law student's curriculum, in fact,
involves exploring the process by which precedents are described at
various levels of generality and by which they are either "distinguished"
or declared "on point." 33 And the process commonly is described as
entailing judgment, informed by a host of relevant factors,
considerations, or policies. The trouble is that when judges take to
describing the significance of history, the judgment more often than not
gets hidden. The resort to history, after all, is intended to remove the
element of personal judgment from the decisional equation. With
respect to determining the appropriate level of generality at which to
describe history, however, any suggestion that personal judgment is not
involved is mistaken.
III. LAW OFFICE HISTORY
Lawyering-or at least the lawyering involved in litigation-is an
exercise in advocacy, marshaling authorities, and evidence in support of
a stated objective. For lawyers, history often is merely another type of
ammunition that may be loaded into a brief or memorandum aimed at
establishing a desired rule of law. Scholars even have coined a none-tooflattering term for the problem: "law office history." As historian A.H.
Kelly described it, "law office history" refers to "the selection of data
favorable to the position being advanced without regard to or concern

32

See generally Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition

of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990).
33
In my day, the required reading that illustrated the point was Edward Levi's classic
account of the development and breakdown of the "inherently dangerous" rule of tort law.
See generallyEDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 9-27 (1949).
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for contradictory data or proper evaluation of the relevance of the data
offered."34
To an extent too often underestimated, judging, too, is an exercise in
advocacy. And, as a result, judges often resort to history much like
lawyers do, as if historical references were like any other rhetorical
resources to be put to use in support of an opinion. The United States
Supreme Court long has been accused of being a repeat offender.
Particularly -although certainly not exclusively- during the Warren
Court era, historians and other scholars bemoaned the Court's tendency
to invoke history based on highly selective use of source materials as a
basis for departing from established precedents or breaking new
doctrinal ground.35 Unfortunately, law office history is not limited to
decisions involving federal constitutional law. State court decisions, too,
occasionally reflect a penchant for questionable treatment of source
materials in several different ways.
A.

History and the Problem of the Cocktail Party

The late Judge Harold Leventhal famously remarked that resorting
to legislative history in the construction of a statute is akin to "entering a
crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's

34 A.H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119, 122 n.13.
35 Mark DeWolfe Howe's comments on the Supreme Court's treatment of the religion
clauses of the First Amendment are illustrative:
By superficial and purposive interpretations of the past, the Court has
dishonored the arts of the historian and degraded the talents of the
lawyer. Such dishonoring and degrading may not be of large moment
when the history that the court manipulates is mere "legal history" the story, that is, of the law's internal growth and development.
When, however, the Court endeavors to write an authoritative chapter
in the intellectual history of the American people, as it does when it
lays historical foundations beneath its readings of the First
Amendment, then any distortion becomes a matter of consequence....
It may be that as a lawyer I take the Court's distorting lessons in
American intellectual history too seriously. I must remind you,
however, that a great many Americans -lawyers and non-lawyers
alike-tend to think that because a majority of the justices have the
power to bind us by their law they are also empowered to bind us by
their history.
MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT
IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 4-5 (1965); see also CHARLES A. MILLER, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969); Kelly, supra note 34; John G. Wofford,

The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation,31 U. CHI. L, REV 502
(1964).
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friends." 36 The point is that, we routinely ignore-or perhaps more
benignly, simply do not see-what is not familiar or useful to us. It is an
unfortunately common complaint about judges, lawyers, and their use of
history in constitutional interpretation.
Consider, for example, the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in State
v. Henry.3 7 At issue in that case was whether a statute prohibiting
distribution of "obscene" publications ran afoul of the free speech
guarantees of the Oregon Constitution. Article I, section 8, of that
constitution provides that "[n]o law shall be passed restraining the free
expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print
freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for
the abuse of this right." The Oregon Supreme Court interprets that
provision to mean that, if a law restrains expression based on the content
of that expression, that law is unconstitutional unless "wholly
contained" within "an original or modem version of a historically
established exception" to the otherwise absolute protections afforded by
38
the constitution.
Consistently with that rule, the Henry court purported to survey the
history of the regulation of the distribution of obscene publications from
the sixteenth century to the time Oregon's constitution was adopted in
the mid-nineteenth century.39 The court did so by reference to a
summary of the history in an American constitutional law text,4° to a
summary of cases and other relevant materials contained in a dissenting
opinion of Justice William 0. Douglas,4 1 and to a treatise on the law of
obscenity by constitutional scholar Frederick F. Schauer.42
After
reviewing those sources, the court concluded "that restrictions on

The oft-quoted remark appears to have been first quoted in Patricia M. Wald, Some
Observationson the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV.
195, 214 (1983). The version I have quoted is taken from Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37
732 P.2d 9 (Or. 1987).
38
The basic doctrine of Oregon free speech analysis was first set out in State v. Robertson,
649 P.2d 569 (Or. 1982). For an examination of the origins and development of free speech
analysis under Robertson, see generally William R. Long, Note, Requiem for Robertson: The
Life and Death of a Free-Speech Framework in Oregon, 34 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 101 (1998).
39 Henry, 732 P.2d at 11-14.
40 td. at 11-12 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 657 (1978)).
41
Id. at 13-14 (quoting United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S.
123, 132-33 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
42
Id. at 14 (citing FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY (1976)).
36
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sexually explicit or obscene expression were not well established at the
43
time the early freedoms of expression were adopted."
The Oregon court then turned to history more specific to the framers
of the Oregon Constitution "to determine if there is any indication that
legislation existing at or near the time of the adoption of Article I, section
8, of the Oregon Constitution demonstrates that 'obscene' expressions
should be included as a historical exception." 44 The court conceded that,
in 1853 and 1855, the territorial legislature had enacted legislation
outlawing the sale, distribution, and possession of obscene writings. The
court rejected that statute as evidence of an intention to regard "obscene"
publications as a historical exception because the legislature had failed to
define the term "obscene." 45 The court then concluded, citing no sources
whatsoever:
[Ajlthough Oregon's pioneers brought with them a
diversity of highly moral as well as irreverent views, we
perceive that most members of the Constitutional
Convention of 1857 were rugged and robust individuals
dedicated to founding a free society unfettered by the
governmental imposition of some people's views of
morality on the free expression of others. We conclude
as we did in reviewing English and American history
that restrictions on sexually explicit and obscene
expression between adults were not well established at
the time of the adoption of Article I, section 8, of the
46
Oregon Constitution.
Henry is a remarkable example of selective reading of sources of
American legal history. 47 For example, while Henry asserted that

Id.
Id.at 15.
Id. at 16.
46 Id.
47 Henry is the only state court decision to conclude, on the basis of history, that
obscenity was intended by nineteenth century framers to be constitutionally protected
speech. For an interesting contrast, see Fordyce v. State, 569 N.E.2d 357, 360-61 (Ind.Ct.
App. 1991), in which the Indiana court examined the constitutional provision on which
Oregon's was based and found in the historical record a "consistent tradition of regulating
obscenity." See also People v. Ford, 773 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1989) (finding that the framers of
the Colorado free speech provision did not intend to protect obscene publications); State v.
Marshall, 859 S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. 1993) (concluding that the framers of the Tennessee free
speech guarantee did not intend to protect obscene publications).
43

44
45

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol38/iss2/7

Landau: A Judge's Perspective on the Use and Misuse of History in State C

20041

State ConstitutionalInterpretation

465

restrictions on obscene publications were not "well established" by the
mid-nineteenth century, the fact is that, before the outbreak of the Civil
War, fully two-thirds of the states had enacted legislation prohibiting the
distribution of obscene publications, particularly to minors. Those states
52
50
49
48
Indiana, 51 Illinois,
included Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
58
57
56
55
54
Michigan,
Iowa, 53 Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
62
61
6
59
Rhode
Pennsylvania,
Oregon,
0
Hampshire,
New
Minnesota,

ARK. STAT. ch. 51, art. VIII, §§ 1-2 (1856) (prohibiting any person from "exhibiting any
4s
obscene or indecent pictures, or figures").
49 CAL. STAT. ch. 271, § 1 (1859) (prohibiting any person from publishing, selling, or
exhibiting "any lewd or obscene book, pamphlet, picture, print, card, paper, or writing").
50 CONN. STAT. tit. 21, ch. 9, § 82 (1835) (prohibiting the importation, publication, sale, or
distribution of "any book, pamphlet, ballad or other printed paper, containing obscene
language, prints or descriptions").
51 IND. REV. STAT. ch. 8, § 52 (1852) (prohibiting sale, exhibition or circulation of "any
obscene book, pamphlet, print or picture").
52
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 128 (1845) (prohibiting the importation or sale of "any obscene
book, pamphlet or print").
53
IOWA CODE tit. 23d, ch. 145, § 2717 (1851) (prohibiting distribution of obscene material
"manifestly tending to corrupt the morals of youth").
54 LA. PENAL CODE, Crimes & Punishments, tit. XI, ch. 1I,art. 340 (1833).
55 ME. REV. STAT. ch. 124, § 13 (1857) (prohibiting distribution of obscene material
"manifestly tending to corrupt the morals of youth").
56 MD. PUB. GEN. LAWS art. 30, § 78 (1860).
57 MAsS. REV. STAT. ch. 130, § 10 (1836) (prohibiting distribution of "obscene prints,
pictures, figures, or descriptions, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of
youth").
58 MIcH. REV. STAT. tit. XXX, ch. 158, § 13 (1846) (prohibiting distribution of obscene
material "manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth").
59 MINN. PUB. STAT. ch. 96, § 11 (1859) (prohibiting the distribution of obscene material
"manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth").
60 N.H. REV. STAT. ch. 113, § 2 (1843) (no person may "sing or repeat, or cause to be sung
or repeated any lewd, obscene or profane song, or shall repeat any lewd, obscene or
profane words; or write or mark in any manner any obscene or profane word, or obscene
or lascivious figure").
61
OR. STAT. ch. 11, § 10 (1855) (prohibiting the distribution of "obscene prints, pictures,
figures or other descriptions, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth").
PA. STAT. LAW art. LX, § 7983 (1920) (P.L. 382, § 40 (March 31, 1860)).
62
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Island, 63 Texas, 64 Tennessee, 65 Vermont, 66 Virginia, 67 and Wisconsin.68
The Henry court mentioned the fact that, in the nineteenth century,
"several" states had passed obscenity statutes, but, beyond that, the
court ignored all of the foregoing statutes save the one enacted by the
Oregon Territorial Legislature.
In addition to legislation on the subject of obscenity, there were
antebellum court decisions recognizing a common-law action for the
The Henry court
distribution of "lewd" or obscene materials. 69
mentioned two. Finally, in concluding that the framers of Oregon's midnineteenth century constitution "were rugged and robust individuals
dedicated to founding a free society unfettered by the governmental
imposition of some people's view of morality," the court wholly ignored
the widespread regulation of sexual conduct and indecent exposure in
70
the mid-nineteenth century.

63 R.1. STAT. tit. XXX, ch. 216, § 12 (1857) (prohibiting distribution of obscene materials
"manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth").
64 TEx. PENAL CODE ch. 4, § 399 (1859) (prohibiting the publication of obscene materials
"manifestly designed to corrupt the morals of youth").
65 TENN. CODE art. II, § 4847 (1858) (prohibiting distribution of obscene materials "into
any family, school, or place of education").
ACTS OF VT. § 23 (1821) (prohibiting publication, sale or distribution of "any lewd or
obscene book, picture or print").
67
VA. CODE ch. 196, § 11 (1849) (prohibiting distribution of obscene material "manifestly
tending to corrupt the morals of youth").
68 Wis. REV. STAT. ch. 139, § 11 (1849) (prohibiting distribution of obscene material
"manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth").
69
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tarbox, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 66 (1848) (publication of
obscene materials); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821) (upholding conviction
for obscene publication); Barker v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. 412 (1852) (indictment for
publicly describing men and women in obscene "positions"); Commonwealth v. Sharpless,
2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815) (upholding indictment for exhibiting obscene painting); Bell
v. State, 31 Tenn. (1 Swan) 42 (1851) (conviction for uttering obscene words in public).
70 Henry, 732 P.d at 17; see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ch. 51, art. VIII, § 1 (1858) (prohibiting
"obscene exhibition" of a person); CONN. STAT. tit. 21, ch. 9, § 79 (1835) (prohibiting
"lascivious" behavior); REV. STAT. ILL. ch. 30, § 127 (1845) (prohibiting "open lewdness, or
other notorious act of public indecency"); IND. REV. STAT. § 22 (1852) (prohibiting
"notorious lewdness" or other public indecency); STAT. LAWS TERR. IOWA § 86 (1839)
(prohibiting "open lewdness, or other notorious act of public indecency"); ME. REV. STAT.
ch. 124, § 5 (1857) (prohibiting "open, gross lewdness and lascivious behavior"); MASS.
GEN. STAT. ch. 165, § 6 (1864) (prohibiting "open and gross lewdness and lascivious
behavior"); OR. GEN. STAT. ch. 48, § 632 (prohibiting "lewdly" exposing a person); PA.
LAWS tit. IV, § 44 (1860) (prohibiting "open lewdness, or any notorious act of public
indecency"); VT. REV. STAT. ch. 99, § 8 (1846) (prohibiting "open and gross lewdness and
lascivious behavior"); VA. CODE tit. 54, ch. 197, § 7 (1849) (prohibiting "open and gross
lewdness and lasciviousness"); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
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The California Supreme Court appears to have examined the record
of that state's constitutional convention with some selectivity in People v.
Houston.71 In that criminal case, the court declined to follow the United
States Supreme Court's recent decision in Moran v. Burbine,72 instead
holding that, under the California Constitution, the defendant's
confession could not be admitted even though he waived his Miranda
rights because the police had held the defendant incommunicado,
keeping him ignorant of the fact that a lawyer who had been retained by
his friends was attempting to consult with him. The court expressly
departed from the federal constitutional rule and based its decision on
the Declaration of Rights in the California Constitution. In justifying the
departure from the federal constitutional rule, the court explained that
state constitutions "offer important local protection against the ebbs and
flows of federal constitutional interpretation." 73
A lone dissenter objected to the court's departure from the federal
precedent "with barely a nod" to the recent Supreme Court decision,
particularly in light of the fact that the relevant state and federal
constitutional provisions were almost identically worded. 74 The majority
responded by noting that, although the wording of the constitutional
provisions indeed was similar, "[tihe debates at the constitutional
convention of 1849 make quite clear that the language of the Declaration
of Rights which comprises article I of the California Constitution was not
based upon the federal charter at all, but upon the constitutions of other
75
states."
Ira Reiner and George Glenn Size have argued, however, that the
records of the California Constitutional Conventions of 1849 and 1878
contain a good deal of evidence that numerous provisions of the
California Declaration of Rights were drawn not from the constitutions
of other states, but from the United States Constitution. 76 According to
Reiner and Size, the framers intended to incorporate numerous
provisions of the Federal Constitution into the state constitution because,

IN AMERICAN HISTORY 127-28 (1993) ("[Tlhe republican period carried on a rich, colonial
tradition, committed to sexual control (or, more accurately, repression). There was no
abrupt break with the past.").
71 725 P.2d 1166 (1986).
72 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
73 Houston, 724 P.2d at 1174.
74 Id. at 1180, 1185 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
7
Id. at 1174 n.13.
76 Ira Reiner & George Glenn Size, The Law Through a Looking Glass: Our Supreme Court
and the Use and Abuse of the CaliforniaDeclarationof Rights, 23 PAC. L.J. 1183 (1992).
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at least as of 1849, those federal provisions did not yet apply to the
states. 77 Whether or not Reiner and Size are correct in their assertion that
the framers of the California Constitution intended to incorporate
wholesale provisions of the Federal Constitution, the fact remains that
the record is not nearly as clear as the California court made it out to be.
Consider also the decisions of a number of courts construing what
are commonly known as "open courts" clauses of state constitutions.
Thirty-eight state constitutions contain such clauses. 78 Although it is
generally agreed that the wording of these clauses traces back to Sir
Edward Coke's commentaries on chapter 29 of the 1225 version of
Magna Carta, there is virtually no record of what the framers of the state
constitutions had in mind when they adopted it. 79 Undaunted, state
courts have attempted to reconstruct what those framers most likely
intended based largely on eighteenth and nineteenth century treatises
and case law.
The problem is that no one has done a particularly thorough job.
Courts seem content to rush to judgment based on a highly selective
reading of sources. In Berry By and Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,8 0
for example, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the framers of that

77 Id. at 1197-1200. Reiner and Size, for example, observe that the record of the 1849
convention includes a colloquy in which one delegate objects to the proposed state
Declaration of Rights because they "are literally from the Constitution from the United
States," prompting an explanation from the Chairman of the convention that:
[tihe fact that this is in the Constitution of the United States does us no
good here; for it has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States that these provisions only apply in the United States Courts. It
is necessary that we should adopt it here if we desire it to apply in our
State courts.
Id. at 1201 (quoting J. Ross BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF
CALIFORNIA, ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER,

1849 at 294 (1850)).
78 For a useful overview of the clauses, their history, and the courts' interpretations of
them, see JENNIFER FRIESEN, 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,

CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES §§ 6-1 to 6-3 (3d ed. 2000). See generally John H. Bauman, Remedies
Provisions in State Constitutions and the Proper Role of the State Courts, 26 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 237 (1991); Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open
Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279 (1995); William C. Koch, Jr.,
Reopening Tennessee's Open Courts Clause: A HistoricalReconsideration ofArticle I, Section 17 of
the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 333 (1997); David Schuman, The Right to a
Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197 (1992).
79 See, e.g., Bauman, supra note 78, at 240 ("The intent of the framers of these state
constitutional provisions is usually impossible to ascertain[.]").
80
717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
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state's open courts provision -Article I, section 11, of the Utah
Constitution - intended it to limit not just the authority of the courts, but
also that of the legislature to alter certain common law remedies. The
court's historical analysis, in its entirety, is as follows:
Thirty-seven states have constitutional provisions
that are essentially similar to the Utah provision. These
provisions, which have no analogue in the federal
Constitution, and the better-known due process clauses
found in both state and federal constitutions appear to
have originated with the Magna Carta and "Sir Edward
Coke's Gloss on Chapter 29 of the 1297 Magna Carta
[which] is remarkably similar to these remedy
provisions."
Provisions such as section 11 have been referred to
as "open courts" clauses and "remedies" clauses. In
fact, section 11 was designed to accomplish several
purposes. The clear language of the section guarantees
access to the courts and a judicial procedure that is
based on fairness and equality. A plain reading of
section 11 also establishes that the framers of the
Constitution intended that an individual could not be
arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to
protect basic individual rights.
A constitutional
guarantee of access to the courthouse was not intended
by the founders to be an empty gesture; individuals are
also entitled to a remedy by "due course of law" for
injuries to "person property, or reputation."1
Thus, beyond noting the pedigree of the provision's phrasing, the court
made no effort to ground its historical conclusions in even the most
rudimentary historical analysis.
The Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Smothers v. Gresham
Transfer, Inc.,8 2 contains an extended analysis of the origins of Oregon's
open courts clause and the historical circumstances surrounding its
adoption in support of a similar conclusion that the clause was intended
to constrain the authority of the legislature to abolish common-law

81
82

Id. at 674-75 (citations omitted).
23 P.3d 333 (2001).
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claims. The court traced the wording of the clause from Magna Carta to
Coke to Blackstone to early colonial charters and early state constitutions
to nineteenth-century case law construing them.8 3
As Jonathan Hoffman has shown, however, even then the court's
research rested on a number of unsubstantiated assumptions and on a
questionable selection of sources8 4 For example, the court devoted a
good deal of attention to open courts clause decisions from the first half
of the nineteenth century. Yet the court cited only a small sample of the
available case law with no explanation for its selection. Among the cases
not cited were several containing declarations that the clause had a much
more limited intended purpose than what the Oregon Supreme Court
85
identified.
The point seems plain enough. If a court is going to resort to history,
then it should not do so selectively. Failing to report the relevant sources
completely and thoroughly only makes clear that it is not history at all
that is being reported, but rather, a version of it that has been artificially
constructed for the occasion.
B.

All Sources Are Not CreatedEqual: Evaluating Sources

A variation on the problem of selectivity is identifying which from
among the apparently relevant sources is reliable to support an assertion
about the framers' intentions. For example, recall that in Henry the
Oregon Supreme Court reached a rather emphatic conclusion about the
intentions of the framers of the state constitutional free speech guarantee
primarily by reference to secondary sources. The first was Laurence
Tribe's constitutional law text, which was devoted to federal
constitutional law doctrine - specifically, definitions of the term
"obscenity" -and did not even address the constitutional history of state
obscene libel laws. 86 The second was a dissenting judicial opinion that

83 Id. at 340-52.
84 Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before Answers: The Ongoing Search to Understand the
Originsof the Open Courts Clause, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1005 (2001).
85 As one of several examples, Hoffman cited the Tennessee Supreme Court's 1834
decision in Fisher's Negroes v. Dabbs, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 119 (1834), in which the court
characterized the function of the clause as prohibiting the legislature from improperly
interfering with pending cases.
86 TRIBE, supra, note 40, at 657-58. Tribe's historical summary consisted of two
paragraphs tracing the history of obscenity regulation from the sixteenth century to the end
of the Civil War. Although he acknowledged that "several" states had enacted obscenity
laws in the early nineteenth century, he cited none of them. Id.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol38/iss2/7

Landau: A Judge's Perspective on the Use and Misuse of History in State C

2004]

State ConstitutionalInterpretation

once again concerned the history of the First Amendment and not state
constitutions. The third was Frederick Schauer's work on the law of
obscenity, a work devoted to doctrine that contains a four-page
introductory history of the definition of "obscenity." 8 7 The court made
no effort to explain why those sources provided a reliable indication of
what the framers of the Oregon Constitution likely thought about the
regulation of obscene publications.
In a similar vein, consider State v. Kessler,88 a case in which the
Oregon Supreme Court was called upon to ascertain whether the state
constitutional guarantee of the right to bear arms applied to the
possession of billy clubs. The court embarked on a history of personal
"arms," and on the basis of that history, concluded that the framers
would have understood billy clubs to be subject to the constitutional
right to bear arms. 89 The principal source for the history? A 1967 book,
Weapons of War, a 208-page anecdotal survey of the entire history of
weaponry from ancient paleolithic weapons to nuclear bombs, written
by an author whose earlier works concentrated primarily on marine
archaeology and space travel. 90
Clearly, just because a court can locate a work purporting to recount
the "history" of an event, idea, or other phenomenon does not mean that
the work is worthy of reliance as a historical reference. Some care must
be brought to the task of evaluating the reliability of sources on which
courts rely in support of historical assertions. Typically, historians

87 Even then, the court quoted only selectively from the work. The court quoted Schauer
as concluding "that early American laws made blasphemy or heresy a crime, but sexual
materials not having an antireligious aspect were left generally untouched." Henry, 732
P.2d at 14. Schauer did say that, but he did so with respect to colonial-period laws. What
the court neglected to note was that Schauer's historical introduction did not stop with
early colonial obscene libel laws. Schauer went on to report that, in England, a significant
shift occurred not long after and that "[bly the beginning of the 19th century, however, the
common-law crime of obscene libel had matured and was used against works which were
purely sexual in content, without the necessity of political or religious implications."
SCHAUER, supra note 42, at 6. Schauer went on to note that "the period from 1800 to 1860
...witnessed the development of a great deal of obscenity law." Id. at 7. With respect to
the development of obscene libel laws in America, Schauer noted that "[tlhe early history
of obscenity regulation in the American colonies tends to parallel its development in
England," and that, as in England, "[t]he years prior to the Civil War witnessed a
proliferation of obscenity and lewdness statutes," although there were relatively few
prosecutions. Id. at 8, 10.
8
614 P.2d 94 (1980).
89 Id. at 98-99.
90 Oregon State Shooting Ass'n v. Multnomah Co., 858 P.2d 1315, 1319 n.3 (Or. App.
1993); see also P. CLEATOR, WEAPONS OF WAR 143-52 (1967).
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identify a number of relevant sources, compare them, assess them, look
for errors and biases, and evaluate them for their reliability as support
for a given proposition. This, of course, is problematic for judges,
because most of us are not trained to do that.
I became altogether too aware of that fact when I drafted an opinion
on the Oregon Constitution's right to bear arms clause. In State v.
Hirsch,91 the issue was the constitutionality of a state statute prohibiting
convicted felons from possessing certain firearms. In reaching the
conclusion that such statutes do not abrogate a constitutional guarantee
of the right to bear arms, I cited a work by historian Michael A.
Bellesiles, which recently had been awarded the prestigious Bancroft
Prize and which had asserted, among other things, that-contrary to
conventional wisdom-gun ownership in America was not widespread
until after the Civil War. 92 What I did not know at the time was that,
since the book's publication, a number of scholars had attempted to test
some of Bellesiles's claims and found them wanting in support from the
sources on which he relied. 93 Fortunately, I had cited his work for a
fairly uncontroversial point, 94 but I nevertheless found unsettling the fact
that the reliability of an award-winning work of history could be so
quickly called into question.
I am aware of one case in which a trial judge actually relied on the
testimony of expert witnesses in evaluating the historical evidence as to
whether a particular weapon would have been the sort that the framers

34 P.3d 1209 (2001).
Id. at 1211 (citing MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A
NATIONAL GUN CULTURE (2000)).
93 The principal bone of contention is Bellesiles' claim that, based on an examination of
probate records, gun ownership in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries was
not as widespread as earlier thought. Several scholars attempted to verify the claim but
could not do so. For an account of the controversy over Bellesiles's research, see generally
James Lindgren, Fall from Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles Scandal, 111 YALE L.J.
2195, 2197 (2002) ("Since the book's publication, scholars who have checked the book's
claims against its sources have uncovered an almost unprecedented number of
discrepancies, errors, and omissions."). Bellesiles is not without defenders, however. See,
e.g., Kenneth Lasson, Blunderbuss Scholarship: Perverting the Original Intent and Plain
Meaning of the Second Amendment, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 127, 134 n.33 (2003) ("Although
Bellesiles' table indicating that guns were not prevalent in estates prior to 1800 has been
successfully challenged by scholars, his analysis of the rise of the gun culture in America
subsequent to the Mexican War, and particularly after the Civil War, has not.").
94 I referred to the author's account of colonial governments that confiscated without
compensation the arms of those who would not take an oath of loyalty. Hirsch, 34 P.3d at
1211 (citing BELLESILES, supra note 92, at 214).
91
92
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of a state constitution would have understood that citizens have a right
to possess. In other cases, professional historians have submitted amicus
briefs describing the relevant historical context of a disputed legal issue.
Such practices obviously are impracticable in most cases. At the very
least, however, courts must resist the temptation to rely on whatever
source materials seem to fit the bill without taking the time and the effort
to evaluate them.
IV. HISTORY AND THE SOUNDS OF SILENCE

There are times when a careful search of the historical record of the
framers' intentions as to a disputed constitutional provision reveals
nothing. There may have been no debate at all on the entire provision.
The' free speech guarantee of the Oregon Constitution, for example, was
adopted without any recorded debate. 95 Or there may have been no
discussion about a particular issue to which the provision arguably
applies. For instance, the Oregon Constitutional Convention debated
extensively the provisions of the Oregon Constitution concerning the
judiciary. But those debates focused primarily on such matters as the
number of judges to serve on the Supreme Court and the length of their
terms of office; they reveal no discussion of the issue whether the
96
framers intended to authorize courts to issue advisory opinions.
The question arises what to do in the face of such a historical
vacuum. One possibility is simply to report that the historical record
offers no evidence of what the framers actually intended. Another,
commonly employed by courts, is to mine the silence for historical
significance by means of negative inference. The reasoning usually goes
something like this: Either the framers intended "X," or they intended
"not-X." If there is no evidence that they intended "X," then it is fair to
assume that they must have intended "not-X."
A good example is a group of cases involving the question whether
the free expression guarantees of state constitutions protect the rights of
citizens to distribute political literature on private property such as
apartment complexes and shopping malls. The threshold issue in each
of those cases is whether the free speech guarantees apply only in the
case of "state action." For example, in Golden Gateway Center v. Golden

See generally Claudia Burton & Andrew Grade, A Legislative History of the Oregon
Constitutionof 1857- PartI (Articles I & II), 37 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 469, 511-12 (2001).
% Claudia Burton, A Legislative History of the Oregon Constitutionof 1857- PartII (Frame of
Government: Articles IlI-VII), 39 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 245, 400-56 (2003).
95
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Gateway Tenants Ass'n,97 the California Supreme Court addressed the
question whether a landlord could enjoin a tenants association from
distributing unsolicited newsletters on the premises of the landlord's
downtown San Francisco apartment complex. The tenants argued that
they had a right to do so guaranteed by the free speech provisions of the
California Constitution, which provides that every person has the right
to "freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of this right." 98 The landlord argued that
the free speech provision applies only to laws or other state actions that
interfered with rights of free expression and does not apply to merely
private action.
The California Supreme Court began by noting, "The breadth of this
language ...suggest[s] an intent to protect the right to free speech
against private intrusions." 99 The court quickly added, however, that
"the absence of an explicit state action limitation in article I, section 2,
subdivision (a) is not dispositive." 100 The court noted that the state
constitution also prohibits any "law" from abridging "liberty of speech,"
and that that wording "indicates an intent to protect against only state
actions."101
The court then turned to the history of the California Constitution
for aid in resolving what it thought was an ambiguity in the wording of
the free speech provision. What the court found, though, was that the
framers of the California Constitution had "adopted this language with
no debate." 10 2 That absence of any debate on the free speech provision
prompted the court to declare: "Thus, the debates over California's free
speech clause give no indication that the framers wished to guard against
private infringements on speech." 10 3 Of course, the debates over
California's free speech clause give no indication that the framers wished
to guard against only state infringements on speech, either.1°4 But that,

97

29 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).

98
99

Id. at 801 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2, subd. (a)).
Id. at 803.
100 Id.
101

Id. at 804.

102

Id.

Id.
Indeed, Jennifer Friesen has argued that the silence of the delegates supports precisely
the opposite inference. She notes that the wording of the free speech clause is not wording
of limitation, but of declaration. "The choice instead to declare the existence of broad and
affirmative rights," she suggests, "creates at least an inference that private as well as official
interference with these rights was meant to be barred." Jennifer Friesen, Should California's
103
104
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interestingly, is not the conclusion that the court chose to draw from the
silent record.
In Cologne v. Westfarms Associates,105 the Connecticut Supreme Court
addressed a similar issue: whether a regional shopping mall violated
state constitutional free speech guarantees when it denied access to a
women's political advocacy group attempting to distribute literature and
collective initiative petition signatures. The court concluded that the
state constitutional free speech provision did not apply in the absence of
state action. The court referred to the history of the adoption of the
state's bill of rights generally, noting that a number of delegates
remarked that the purpose of adopting a bill of rights was to enshrine
the basic individual liberties of the people "in a written constitution to
ensure their protection from governmental infringement." 106 As to the
more specific question whether the framers intended also to ensure their
protection from private infringement, the court relied on the silence of
the historical record. Referring to the origins of the federal and state bills
of rights, the court explained:
There is nothing in the history of these documents to
suggest that they were intended to guard against private
interference with such rights. Similarly, a review of their
origin discloses no evidence of any intention to vest in
those seeking to exercise such rights as free speech and
petition the privilege of doing so upon property of
107
others.
The court identified nothing in that adoption history that suggested
that the framers actually discussed whether the Connecticut bill of rights
was intended to protect against private infringement, much less
identified anything in that history suggesting that they did not intend to
protect against private infringement. On that specific question, the court
apparently found nothing. But out of that evidentiary nothingness, the
court arrived at an unequivocal historical conclusion.

Constitutional Guarantees of Individual Rights Apply Against Private Actors? 17 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 111, 119 (1989). This inference, she contends, "is supported by the convention
records," in particular, the fact that there was no debate. Id.
105 469 A.2d 1201 (Conn. 1984).
106

Id. at 1207.

107 Id. at 1208.
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The problem with this sort of reasoning should be obvious. In most
cases, it is simply not logical. It employs what Fischer calls the "fallacy
of the negative proof": that is, an attempt to sustain a factual proposition
simply by negative inference. 0 8 It assumes that the framers could have
had only one of two intentions when, in fact, there is often at least a third
possibility, if not others. In the state action cases, for example, the courts
assume that the framers of the state free speech guarantees either
intended that those provisions apply to state actors only or also to
private actors. There is at least a third possibility, namely, that the issue
never arose and that they had no real intentions one way or the other.
It may be noted that I qualified my criticism of reasoning from
silence by saying that, "[i]n most cases," doing so is illogical. I include
that qualification in recognition of the possibility that in some cases, at
least theoretically, all of the logical possibilities as to the framers
intentions could be identified and all but one of them could be
eliminated. Even then, though, reasoning from silence permits at best a
weak inference, an inference that cannot be confirmed or disproved by
reference to the historical record. 10 9
Thus, for instance, in State v. Conger,11° the Oregon Supreme Court
addressed the meaning of the grand jury provision of the Oregon
Constitution, which provides: "A grand jury shall consist of seven jurors
chosen by lot from the whole number of jurors in attendance at the court,
five of whom must concur to find an indictment.""' The defendant had
been indicted by a grand jury consisting of only six members. He
challenged the indictment on the ground that it violated the state
constitutional requirement that grand juries consist of seven jurors. The
state argued that the constitution did not preclude grand juries from
operating at less than the full complement of seven members, as long as

FISCHER, supra note 25, at 47-48.
See, e.g., MARTHA HOWELL & WALTER PREVENIER, FROM RELIABLE SOURCES: AN
INTRODUCTION TO HISTORICAL METHODS 74 (2001). According to Howell and Prevenier:
Of course, an argument from silence can serve as presumptive
evidence of the "silenced" event only if ...the person suppressing the
information was in a position to have the information, and was
purporting to give a full account of the story from which he omitted
the crucial information, and if there were no compelling reasons why
he should have omitted the information (other than a wish to conceal).
108
109

Id.
110 878 P.2d 1089 (Or. 1994).
1l
OR. CONST. art. VII, § 5(2).
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five of them concurred in the indictment. A divided Oregon Supreme
Court agreed.
The majority's reasoning was almost entirely historical. It first
turned to the record of the debates of the 1857 constitutional convention.
The court found in that record extensive debates over whether to have
grand juries at all and, if so, how large or small they should be. The
court noted that various numbers -five, seven, nine, twelve, fifteen, and
eighteen-were proposed. Unfortunately, the court said that the record
of the constitutional debates provides no direct evidence about whether
the number discussed was meant to be a quorum requirement to find an
12
indictment.
The court did not stop there. In context, the court suggested, the
silence of the debates permits an inference that, if the framers had
intended the stated number of jurors to serve as a quorum requirement,
they would have said so. The court reached that conclusion for three
reasons. First, it noted that elsewhere in the state's constitution-in
provisions concerning the legislative branch-a two-thirds quorum
requirement was clearly stated. Thus, the court reasoned, the convention
certainly knew how to express a quorum requirement. Second, the court
noted that the grand jury provisions of the Oregon territorial statutes
expressly included quorum requirements; for example, specifying that
grand juries shall consist of twenty-three jurors "'any sixteen of which
shall be sufficient to constitute a grand jury.'" Third, the court noted that
a number of courts in other jurisdictions - although not all of them - had
concluded that the number of jurors to be summoned or impaneled was
1 3
not a quorum requirement. 1
Give the court credit for not merely relying on the silence of the
record of debates and calling it a day. The court attempted to construct a
basis from which to draw inferences from that silence. The problem is,
the best that the court could do is establish a permissible inference. The
court, in other words, established only that it is possible that the framers
intended the state constitution not to impose a quorum requirement for
grand juries.

112
Conger, 878 P.2d at 1096-97. The court went on to note, correctly, that "loin the other
hand, the materials do not definitively establish that a quorum of seven was not intended."
Id.
113
Id. at 10%-98.
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Indeed, as the dissenting opinion in that case pointed out, the same
sources on which the court relied also support the opposite inference,
that is, that the framers of the constitution intended it to mean precisely
what it says: the "grand jury shall consist of seven jurors." 114 The fact
that the framers elsewhere in the constitution specified a quorum
requirement of two-thirds of each house of the legislature arguably
suggests that, if they had intended that something fewer than all of the
members of a body is required, they would have said so. Similarly, the
fact that the territorial statutes specifically referred to grand jury quorum
requirements arguably suggests that, if they had intended something
fewer than all seven grand jurors would suffice, they would have said
so. Particularly in light of the fact that the express quorum requirements
applied to very large bodies, it reasonably could be inferred that the
framers reduced the number of grand jurors to only seven so that lesser
quorum requirements would be unnecessary.
In other words, in light of all of the circumstantial historical
evidence, the silence in the record of debates as to the particular issue at
hand supports at least two opposing inferences as to the framers'
intentions. In no way can it fairly be said that, as a matter of responsible
history, it is probable that they intended one or the other. In the best of
circumstances, reasoning from silence is a risky business.
V.

HISTORY AND "THE WHOPPER"

Courts employ other strategies in response to a historical record that
provides no direct evidence of the intentions of the framers of a state
constitution. Often-very often, in fact-courts will employ a series of
"presumptions" to fill in the gaps. The California Supreme Court's
decision in the Golden Gateway case provides an excellent example.
Recall that in that case, upon finding that the free speech provisions of
the California Constitution had been adopted with no debate
whatsoever, the court commented that "[tihus, the debates over
California's free speech clause give no indication that the framers wished
15
to guard against private infringements on speech."
The court did not stop there. It went on to note that the framers of
the 1849 constitution had borrowed the wording of California's free
speech guarantees from the state constitution of New York, which had

114
115

OR. CONST. art. VII, § 5(2); Conger,878 P.2d at 1098-1103 (Unis, J., dissenting).
Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797, 804 (Cal. 2001).
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been adopted twenty-eight years earlier, in 1821. Relying on a 1985
decision of the New York Court of Appeals, the California court noted
that it was clear that the framers of the 1821 New York Constitution had
intended that the New York free speech clause protect against only state
action and not private conduct. The court then took the following leap:
"Because the framers of the California Constitution adopted New York's
free speech clause almost verbatim, we reasonably conclude they had the
16
same intent as their New York counterparts."
State constitutional decisions abound with similar examples. In
Armatta v. Kitzhaber,117 for instance, the Oregon Supreme Court resorted
to the records of the debates on the 1851 Indiana Constitution that served
as a template for much of the Oregon Constitution and then imputed to
the Oregon delegates in 1857 the same intentions because "we have
found nothing to suggest that the framers of the Oregon Constitution
l l8
had a different understanding or intent."
Sometimes the courts employ the fiction that sources from other
jurisdictions were, at least in a temporal sense, "available" to the
framers. In State v. Cookman," 9 the Oregon Supreme Court confronted
the meaning of the state constitutional ex post facto clause. The court
turned to the historical record, but found that the record of the
constitutional convention "does not indicate the convention's intent in
adopting the provision." 120 All was not lost, however. The court
observed that the Oregon clause was patterned after the ex post facto
clause of the 1851 Indiana Constitution, which was substantially similar
to a provision in the 1816 constitution of the same state, which, in turn,
had been construed in 1822 by the Indiana Supreme Court. The Oregon
court then concluded that, in construing the Oregon Constitution, it was
entitled to rely on the 1822 Indiana case because the decision "was
available to the framers of the Oregon Constitution when they decided to
adopt the Indiana ex post facto provision in our state constitution." 121
Similarly, in DeMendoza v. Huffinan,l"' the Oregon Supreme Court
addressed the question whether permitting the state to recover a portion

116 Id. at 805-06.
117 959 P.2d 49 (Or. 1998).
118

Id. at 58.

119

920 P.2d 1086 (Or. 1996).

120 Id. at 1091.
121 Id. at 1093.
122 51 P.3d 1232 (Or. 2002).
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of all punitive damage awards violated the state constitution's remedy
clause. In describing the intentions of the framers with respect to the
subject of punitive damages, the court noted that two early nineteenthcentury treatises were much cited by courts in other states. The court
then announced that "we assume that the framers of the Oregon
Constitution were familiar with at least some of the many cases dealing
with punitive damages that were decided under the principles discussed
in those treatises, even if they were not directly familiar with the treatises
themselves." 123 Apparently aware that it was taking something of a leap
there, the court explained that it felt comfortable taking that leap because
it had discovered references in Oregon's territorial case law to both
treatises, albeit for unrelated propositions of law. 124
Clearly, the courts are employing fictions to plug the holes that they
find in their historical records. The California Supreme Court in Golden
Gateway, for example, was not saying that the framers of the 1849
California Constitution actually intended to adopt the intentions of their
New York counterparts. The court did not attempt to demonstrate that
the notes of the 1821 New York convention were even available to the
California delegates twenty-eight years later, much less that any of the
California delegates read those notes and categorically agreed with
them.
In the same vein, the Oregon Supreme Court was not suggesting in
Armatta that the Oregon delegates actually knew what the framers of the
1851 Indiana Constitution had said and that they intended to adopt the
views of their Indiana counterparts without qualification. Nor was the
court suggesting in Cookman that the framers of the Oregon Constitution
actually kept abreast of decisions of the Indiana Supreme Court and that
they intended to ratify an 1822 decision when they incorporated the
wording of the Indiana Constitution into their own.
Of course the use of fictions is common - even indispensable - in the
law. 125 Intriguingly, in support of its decision to impute the intentions of
the New York convention delegates to those of the California
convention, the California court cited as authority just such a common
fiction of statutory construction, that identically worded provisions are

123 Id. at 1239.
124 Id. at 1239 n.7.

12 See generally LON F. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967) (describing the nature of various
legal fictions and the reasons for their use).
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presumed to have been intended to carry identical meaning. 126
history is, if nothing else, not supposed to be about fiction.

481
But

Moreover, on even limited reflection, some of the fictions that the
courts employ to justify assertions of historical fact appear to be outright
Is it really reasonable to impute intentions from one
whoppers.
collective body to another over the span of decades in the absence of any
evidence that one was aware of the other's views?
The presumptions also frequently rely on what is known as the
"fallacy of elitism," that is, "conceptualizing human groups in terms of
127
their upper strata." Recall that, in Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc.,
the Oregon Supreme Court traced the history of the Oregon remedy
clause from the Magna Carta, to Sir Edward Coke's Second Institute, to
Blackstone's Commentaries, to early state constitutions and declarations of
rights, and to case law construing those constitutions. 128 Did the court
mean to suggest that the mid-nineteenth century framers of the Oregon
Constitution were familiar with all of those sources and concepts? At
best, the court could suggest that some portion of the delegates were
lawyers who might have been familiar with some of the materials that it
described. 129 But it is altogether another matter to impute to everyone
else in attendance the knowledge of the elites.
What the resort to such fictions demonstrates is that, when the courts
employ them, they are not really describing "history" in the ordinary
sense. When they say that the framers "intended X," they are not saying
that the framers actually intended X. The courts mean only that, within
the framework of an artificial, hypothetical, legal "history" in which
various rules and presumptions may be taken to apply, the framers so
intended. That, of course, is not history at all.

126 Golden Gateway, 29 P.3d at 806 (citing Stockton Civic Theatre v. Bd. of Supervisors, 423
P.2d 810 (Cal. 1967), which invoked the presumption that statutory language taken
verbatim from constitutional provision must be given the same meaning as that given the
constitutional provision).
127 23 P.3d 333 (Or. 2001).
128 Id. at 340-51.

129 Of the sixty delegates to the 1857 Oregon Constitutional Convention, thirty-three were
farmers, eighteen were lawyers, five were gold miners, two were journalists, and one was a
civil engineer. THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1857, 28-29 (Charles Carey ed., 1926).
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HISTORY AND THE PROBLEM OF UNCERTAINTY

The final problem - at least the final one that I discuss - in a sense
sums up all the others. It is that courts tend to treat history as the
systematic examination of facts to determine, in Ranke's famous phrase,
Once determined, those facts are set in
"how it actually was."
precedential concrete.
In Oregon, for example, as I have noted, the Supreme Court in State
v. Henry concluded that the framers of the constitutional guarantee of
free expression were "rugged and robust" individuals who were not
concerned with regulating public morality. 130 Some years after Henry,
the Oregon Court of Appeals addressed the question whether, in light of
that decision, a statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene materials
to children violated the state constitution. 131 Relying on Henry, a
majority of the court held that it did.132 I dissented, questioning among
other things the accuracy of Henry's historical analysis. 133 The majority's
response was to conclude that, although my analysis was perhaps "more
thorough," it was foreclosed by the Supreme Court's reading of the
historical record in Henry.134 The Supreme Court, in other words, had
determined "how it actually was," and that was that.
In many cases, however, the idea that history can be so conclusively
and permanently nailed down is no more than wishful thinking. All too
often, history will not reveal a concrete, objectively undebatable
description of, for example, what the framers actually thought. Most of

130 See supra notes 37-70 and accompanying text.
131 State v. Maynard, 5 P.3d 1142 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
132 Id. at 1151-52.
133 Id. at 1168-89.
134 Id. at 1157. In a subsequent case, involving the constitutionality of a statute
prohibiting public sexual conduct, I drafted an opinion for a majority of the court, sitting en
banc, concluding that the statute did not violate the constitutional free expression
guarantee. State v. Ciancanelli, 45 P.3d 451 (Or. App. Ct. 2002). The dissenting opinion,
among other things, took the majority to task for departing from the historical facts as
found by the Henry court "to spin a different view of history." Id. at 474 (Brewer, J.,
dissenting). The complaint prompted the following rhetorical response from the majority:
That raises an interesting question: When the Supreme Court
makes such general comments about American legal history, are lower
courts bound by them, even when they are demonstrably incorrect? If,
for example, the Supreme Court decides that John Wilkes Booth did
not assassinate Abraham Lincoln, are we bound by that "decision" in
future cases?
Id. at 463 n.21. The Supreme Court granted review of the decision.
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the time, the best that history has to offer is a hypothesis, a probability
that the framers intended one thing or another, subject always to
reevaluation and revision.
Part of the problem is in the nature of the specific endeavor, namely,
ascertaining the intentions of framers of a constitutional provision.
First, the very goal- ascertaining the intentions of a collective
body -is suspect. 135 One need not embrace wholesale the suggestions of
proponents of public choice theory -that, because of the nature of group
decision-making processes, reference to a collective intention is
unrealistic 3 6- to understand that identifying an understanding of
constitutional meaning shared by a group of dozens of individuals who
137
lived as much as 200 years ago is a risky business.
Second, even assuming that the goal is attainable, sources often are
scarce. For example, as I have noted, the framers of Oregon's and
California's free speech guarantees adopted a constitutional text with no
recorded debate. At best, in such cases, we may attempt to reconstruct
what those people probably were thinking based on a series of inferences
drawn from the social, legal, cultural, and other contexts in which they
acted.

135 For a discussion of some of the inherent difficulties in ascertaining the intentions of a
collective body as a matter of history, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding,60 B.U. L. REv. 204,212-17 (1980).
136 For an introduction to public choice theory and its implications, see generally DANIEL
A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOIcE: A CRICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).

See also Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988).
137 The problem is further compounded if the focus of the search for original intentions is
broadened from the relatively small group of "framers" at a convention to the thousands of
people who adopted the constitutional provision. On the question whether ratifier intent is
the relevant inquiry, see generally Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT 77, 79 (1988) (ratifier intent "is the original intent in a
constitutional sense"); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353,
375 n.130 (1981) ("[Tlhe intentions of the ratifiers, not the Framers, is in principle
decisive."); Brest, supra note 135, at 215 ("If the intent of the framers is to be attributed to
the provision, it must be because the other adopters have in effect delegated their intentionvotes to the framers."). See also McKeigan v. Grass Lake Township Supervisor, 587 N.W.2d
505, 507 n.2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (" [Ilt is clear that it is the intent of the people who adopted
the proposed constitution that is controlling, and not the intent manifested in the internal
deliberations."); Monaghan v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 315 P.2d 797, 801 (Or. 1957) ("The
constitution derives its force and effect from the people who ratified it and not from the
proceedings of the convention where it was framed[.]").
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Third, even when sources are available, they often are exasperatingly
ambiguous. Recall that the historical evidence in State v. Conger, the
grand jury quorum case, gave rise to at least two essentially equally
plausible interpretations. 138 In such cases, we are left with the task of
attempting to reconstruct what the sources probably mean in order, in
turn, to infer from that what the framers probably intended a given
constitutional provision to mean.
Another part of the problem is not specific to the project of
ascertaining the original intent of a state constitutional provision. It is
inherent in the writing of history generally. History -at least the sort of
history that concerns more than the determination of a discrete date or
description of an event -does not produce "facts" as judges often think
of them. History produces evidence that must be interpreted. And any
interpretation of historical evidence is constantly subject to reevaluation
and revision. This is so for at least several reasons.
First, the very nature of history itself is subject to constant
reevaluation and revision. The history of historiography suggests that
our conceptions of what it means to record "history" have changed
remarkably from the days of ancient Greeks-when Herodotus and
Thucydides departed from the ancient tradition of recording myths and
cycles and introduced the idea of rational, critical history -to the twentyfirst century, when post-modern historians debate-whether ascertaining
139
a historical "fact" is a meaningful conception at all.
Second, apart from philosophical debates about the nature of history,
there is the fact that it is never certain that the "facts" ever are fully
known. Just when a historian thinks that he or she has collected all the
relevant evidence, someone else comes up with additional evidence that
challenges prevailing accounts and explanations. In my own state, for
example, records of the 1857 Constitutional Convention that for years
had been thought to be lost were only recently discovered in the library
of the Oregon Historical Society. 14°

138 See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
139 For surveys of the history of historiography, see generally ERNST BREISACH,
HISTORIOGRAPHY: ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL, & MODERN (2d ed. 1994); MARK T. GILDERHUS,
HISTORY AND HISTORIANS: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUcTION (5th ed. 2003); NORMAN J.
WILSON, HISTORY IN CRISIS?: RECENT DIRECTIONS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY (1999).

140 Burton & Grade, supra note 95, at 469-70. Interestingly, no one knows quite how the
documents came to be in the possession of the Historical Society. Id. at 470 n.4.
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Third, it is in the nature of the historical exercise that the facts are
subject to interpretation. This may be a result of the inherent ambiguity
in the source materials. Or it may be a result of the historical point of
reference from which the account is being written. Some historians,
following the hermeneutic tradition of Hans-Georg Gadamer,141 suggest
that all history is hopelessly subjective and that descriptions of the past
cannot be divorced from the assumptions, prejudices, and expectations
of the present. Such reasoning leads to a sort of solipsism that ultimately
is not very useful in the real world. But one need not endorse the
conclusions of such radical relativists to see the essential truth that facts
do look different depending on who is observing them and when the
observing is taking place.
History, in other words, is a moving target. As an example of the
extremely fluid nature of historical analysis, consider the course of
scholarship concerning the law of free expression over the last century.
Federal and state judges in the nineteenth century were remarkably
hostile to constitutional free speech claims. Relying on Blackstone's
eighteenth century commentaries on the English common law, they
concluded that the framers would have understood that states retain the
authority to regulate speech to the extent that it poses a threat to social
order.1 42 As late as 1907, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes opined for the
United States Supreme Court that the First Amendment prohibited only
143
prior restraint of speech.
With the advent of World War I and the enactment of criminal
syndicalism statutes, progressives began to challenge traditional
assumptions about the intended scope of constitutional free speech
protections. In 1920, Zechariah Chafee, in a seminal publication, Freedom
of Speech, suggested that the nineteenth century assumption that
constitutional free speech guarantees were intended to reflect
Blackstone's reading of the English common law was mistaken.1 44 To the
contrary, he suggested that the framers intended to overthrow the
English conception of free speech rights.

141
142

See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975).
For an interesting summary of mid- to late-nineteenth century judicial perspectives on

free speech claims, see generally DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS

129-46 (1997).
143 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1907).
144

ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 9-35 (1920).
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For decades, Chafee's historical analysis was granted wide
acceptance among judges and scholars in the legal community. In 1960,
published his
historian Leonard Levy
however,
revisionist
groundbreaking work, Legacy of Suppression, in which he savagely
attacked Chafee's selection and interpretation of the relevant sources and
concluded that, in fact, the framers did not intend to depart from the
English common law.145 Levy's views then achieved the wide acceptance
that once had belonged to Chafee's. 146 But that, too, changed. In 1985,
Levy reevaluated his own work and, in an expanded and revised
147
version, he qualified the bold conclusions of his earlier book.
Meanwhile, other scholars have begun to question some of Levy's
conclusions. 14s
Thus, orthodoxy gives way to revisionism, which
becomes a new orthodoxy that, in turn, gives way to new revisionism.
That is how history works.
VII. CONCLUSION

Resorting to history in interpreting state constitutions is a much
more difficult task than we have made it out to be. To begin with, judges
who turn to history must explain what it is that they are doing. Are they
saying that history is merely a useful context for understanding the
purpose of a disputed provision, or are they saying that identifying the
framers' understanding of a provision establishes its meaning? If judges
do mean to say the latter, then it strikes me that it is incumbent on them
to explain why they are doing so, for, as I have noted, history and
meaning are two different endeavors, and the connection between the
two not obvious.
Moreover, judges who turn to history must commit themselves to
doing it right.149 It is not necessary to acquire an advanced academic
degree to understand that responsible historical analysis means not
indulging in selective reliance on sources and invoking questionable

145 LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY
AMERICAN HISTORY (1960).

See, e.g., Stanley C. Brubaker, Original Intent and Freedom of Speech and Press, in THE
ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 82-83 (Eugene W.
Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991) ("[Slince 1960, none has been able to claim plausible" the "romantic"
notion that the framers intended to wipe out the common law of sedition).
147 LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985).
148 See, e.g., David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of
Expression in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REv. 795 (1985).
149 For a useful list of "rules for originalists," see generally Powell, supra note 12.
146
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assumptions and fictions. Judges who want to rely on history must be
willing to do their homework.
In a related vein, judges who turn to history must understand its
limitations. Historical analysis, even done well, often will fail to
establish with anything approximating probability what the framers of a
constitutional provision intended. It may even show that there were
multiple, and conflicting, intentions. Judges should be prepared to
accept that and not try to make history tell us more than it fairly does.
Finally, judges who turn to history must realize that it does not
obviate the need to exercise judgment. It is inherent in the nature of
historical analysis that those doing it must engage in value judgments in
selecting and evaluating sources and in describing their significance.
Those who contend that resort to history is necessary to avoid the
exercise of personal judgment are kidding themselves. It simply cannot
be avoided.
Accepting the limitations of historical analysis in state constitutional
interpretation means that, whether or not a court subscribes to an
originalist view of the process, it will be tougher to justify interpretive
decisions on the basis of history. That does not mean that judges should
forswear resorting to history in construing their state constitutions. Even
non-originalists recognize that history always provides useful context for
ascertaining the meaning of a provision. Constitutions are, after all,
historical documents. But courts should abjure the sort of "law office
history" that has been employed in the past. It leaves courts open to
criticism that jeopardizes the very legitimacy that resorting to history is
supposed to serve. In the final analysis, judges may be required to
acknowledge more candidly the judgments that are involved in
constitutional interpretation. In my view, such candor is much less a
threat to legitimacy than is bad history.
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